A privacy and information security blog with rambling thoughts from my feeble mind, that may or may not be of any service to anyone at any time.
Monday, December 1, 2008
Protecting our most valuable gifts
Various Internet Safety links for parents and children
http://www.netsmartz.org/
http://www.ConnectSafely.org
http://www.safekids.com
http://www.safeteens.com
http://www.kidswatch.com/
Wireless routers with filtering software built-in
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,1759,1619375,00.asp
http://tech.yahoo.com/blogs/devlin/5684
http://www.netgear.com/Products/RoutersandGateways/SuperGWirelessRouters/WGT624SC.aspx
Fire Safety for the home
http://www.firstalert.com/tundra_fire_extinguishing_spray.php
http://www.usfa.dhs.gov/kids/flash.shtm
Great sites about auto safety, and other safety items for kids
http://www.kidshealth.org/kid/watch/out/car_safety.html
http://www.aap.org/healthtopics/carseatsafety.cfm
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/portal/site/nhtsa/menuitem.9f8c7d6359e0e9bbbf30811060008a0c
Teen Driving
http://www.nsc.org/issues/teendriving/guide.htm
http://www.skipbarber.com/driving_school/mazda/new_driver.aspx
Monday, November 3, 2008
Encryption and Security Awareness – it’s the law!
Several states are jumping on the information security and privacy legislation train, and it is leaving the station at full speed. Similar to the data breach laws that are now in place for 44 states now, we can expect a similar rush by states to initiate similar laws calling for specific security measures to be enacted to protect personal information, and liability for companies that have breaches
Massachusetts for example passed the following legislation, which calls for some very specific controls and measures to be enacted to comply with the state law.
This regulation is applicable for entities who “own, license, store or maintain personal information about a resident of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts”.
According to the regulation personal information and records are defined as such:
"Personal information," a Massachusetts resident's first name and last name or first initial and last name in combination with any one or more of the following data elements that relate to such resident: (a) Social Security number; (b) driver's license number or state-issued identification card number; or (c) financial account number, or credit or debit card number, with or without any required security code, access code, personal identification number or password, that would permit access to a resident’s financial account; provided, however, that “Personal information” shall not include information that is lawfully obtained from publicly available information, or from federal, state or local government records lawfully made available to the general public.
“Record” or “Records,” any material upon which written, drawn, spoken, visual, or electromagnetic information or images are recorded or preserved, regardless of physical form or characteristics.
Two of the more interesting and detailed requirements are:
“The encryption of all personal information stored on laptops or other portable devices, and “to the extent technically feasible, encryption of all transmitted records and files containing personal information that will travel across public networks, and encryption of all data to be transmitted wirelessly”
“Each covered entity must train employees on the proper use of the computer security system and the importance of personal information security.”
Nevada has similar legislation that went into effect on October 1, 2008, which prohibits businesses from transmitting unencrypted personal information on consumers on external networks.
So how can your organization begin to comply with this type of legislation?
- Consult internal and external counsel on these matters and ensure you have someone specialized in privacy & data security law.
- Ensure you have a written information security plan that uses a published industry standard to use as a guideline (ISO, PCI, etc.). Most of the legislation is based on using “reasonable” security measures that cover (and this is the de facto language) administrative, technical, and physical safeguards.
- Once your standard is in place in your program – work to achieve that standard, by performing a risk assessment against the organization so you know where to start, and where to properly spend money and resources.
- Know where your important and confidential data is within the organization, and how people are using it. Get line managers that are responsible for this type of data together and ask them in a very non-accusatory manner how the organization is using and protecting this type of data.
- Exercise control over service providers and require them to contractually protect your data and follow your standards, as well as auditing them to ensure they are doing so.
- Have a plan ready in case none of this work and you have to report a breach.
Obviously, these are all very high-level requirements and are by no means an exhaustive list. Every organization is different and requires different controls and processes. The more you understand the data flows, and the risks to the organization the better you will be when the worst happens.
One quick note - in the definition of person, the commonwealth intentionally left any of their agencies out of this definition so they wouldn't have to abide by this legislation - NICE!
Friday, October 10, 2008
Spotting bogus e-mails using grammar checking
isc.sans.org and several other sites are reporting a bogus e-mail from Microsoft containing malicious code, an example of which is below. In addition to the various technical measures that can be taken such as blocking executables in e-mail, effective spam filtering, A/V protection, and endpoint protections, users should also be reminded to be on alert for these types of issues. Besides telling them to never click on these types of items, and not giving them the local rights to accomplish this, I believe we can go further in order to promote more security conscious activities at home, and hopefully reduce the number of zombied systems available for bot herders. In this example it is easy to spot the poor grammar in the e-mail as a sure giveaway that this is bogus. OK, my grammar is not exactly perfect either, but that is not the point. Now Microsoft or any company would most likely never distribute updates in this manner, but hopefully any valid communication from a company of this size would certainly not contain as many errors as I have illustrated below in bold, and that is exactly one of the items I point out to end users in classes I teach. My guess is that someone for whom English is not his or her native language wrote this – a former or current Russian state would be my guess.
Dear Microsoft Customer,Please notice that Microsoft company has recently issued a Security Update for OSMicrosoft Windows. The update applies to the following OS versions: MicrosoftWindows 98, Microsoft Windows 2000, Microsoft Windows Millenium, Microsoft WindowsXP, Microsoft Windows Vista.Please notice, that present update applies to high-priority updates category. In order to help protect your computer against security threats and performance problems, we strongly recommend you to install this update.Since public distribution of this Update through the official websitehttp://www.microsoft.com/ would have result in efficient creation of a malicious software, we made a decision to issue an experimental private version of an update for all Microsoft Windows OS users. As your computer is set to receive notifications when new updates are available, [how do they know that?] youhave received this notice. In order to start the update, please follow the step-by-step instruction:
1. Run the file, that you have received along with this message.
2. Carefully follow all the instructions you see on the screen.If nothing changes after you have run the file, probably in the settings of your OS you have an indication to run all the updates at a background routine.
In that case,at this point the upgrade of your OS will be finished.We apologize for any inconvenience this back order may be causing you.
Friday, October 3, 2008
Travelers Privacy Protection Act of 2008
I still don’t believe you can legally be compelled to reveal your password, and the cases that have been tried have had so many other circumstances that had the person simply refused to divulge their password they would have probably prevailed. There is no judicial precedent on this matter, but it seems to be ill conceived on so many levels, not the least of which is the 5th amendment. Laptop computers and other electronic devices contain too much personal or corporate confidential information on them to simply let a government employee have complete access and copies of that data. Strong encryption and just one judicial precedence will hopefully end this matter for most of us law abiding citizens, and I’m sure the law breakers would never think to store this information in e-mail, or some other Internet storage application they can send back and forth across most borders without any checks.
But perhaps that is the government's next priority into our lack of privacy – let’s hope not.
Wednesday, September 24, 2008
Information Security and Privacy Class
Chris
Class Notes
Thursday, August 7, 2008
What can be learned from data breach reports?
The database covers the period from January of 2000, until July 31 of this year and includes 1051 breaches. Here is a breakdown of some of the interesting facts after removing a couple which show disputed in the type of breach.
87% of the breaches were not due to a loss from a third-party. Another report from Verizon claims that 39% of their breaches are from a third-party. I believe there may be some under reporting of this statistic here due to the third parties reporting, and their customers not reporting the same incident.
The distribution of breaches amongst Business, Government, Education and Medical were 34%,24%, 30% and 12% respectively.
Stolen data was the highest reported breach type at 37% followed by “hack” which is classified by Attrition as “computer-based intrusion, data not generally publicly exposed” came in second at 21% followed by web-based intrusions at 15%.
Friday, July 18, 2008
NebuAd hauled down to Capitol Hill
NebuAd CEO Robert Dykes said at a House hearing that the Internet service providers with which his company partners send their customers letters 30 days before any tracking begins.
The letters, which Dykes described as "robust," tell subscribers how they can opt out of the monitoring. If the customer doesn't respond, however, NebuAd begins collecting data on their browsing activities to offer ads relevant to their interests.
Yep - you can opt out alright, then they will place a cookie in your browser that will prevent their technology from performing its dastardly deeds. Of course if you ever get rid of that cookie, you are right back in the mix.
Thursday, July 17, 2008
Another ISP caught with their NebuAd down
This is the first of their "five privacy principles" that apparently allow them to look at where their customers travel on the web.
EMBARQ creates, obtains, and uses your personal information to provide you the products and services you order, and to present you with product and service offerings that we believe may interest you
This is their definition of personal information.
Personal information is information that is directly associated with a specific person such as his or her name, address, telephone number, e-mail address, activities, and personal preferences.
We collect personal information about users of our products or services in the normal course of our business. This is how we know where to send you a bill for service...
Or an ad for something you may want.
All of their references to cookies in the privacy policy relate to cookies on the Embarq site, and mention nothing of the types of cookies used in the NebuAd realm. I am usually the last one to think that congress does much effectively, but perhaps this will be the nail in the coffin of this technology and stop other ISP's from getting the same idea. These types of privacy mishaps where companies had a privacy policy not outlining these types of activities, but thought it was their god given right to do so have gotten several companies in trouble with the FTC for unfair and deceptive trade practices, and a nice visit form the auditors biannually for the next 20 years. I'm hoping Embarq is next, and it serves as a lesson to other ISPs.
Wednesday, July 16, 2008
Verizon data breach report
Verizon Small Business Services released a study of more than 500 data breaches that they were consulted in from 2004 to 2007 entitled 2008 DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONS REPORT. Whether you can take the findings in here to be an accurate barometer of the state of information security or not is up to you, but I am much more impressed with this report, that anything else I have seen over the last several years. The sample size is a little small, and I have some concern over the source, since I didn’t even know Verizon did this type of consulting. So I am either out of touch, or other people in similar size organizations don’t know this fact either. They did report that 26% of the companies in the survey had at least 1001 employees. The actual segment states 1001-10,000, but since that is a little broad, I will go with my previous assessment and assume most of them are on the low end of this range.
What this report tells us about the state of Information security is that what we are doing, and where we are spending our money is not working, and that although you can write all of the policies you want, you had better make damn sure someone is reading them and following them. Now for my rambling thoughts and highlights of the report.
The report covered a period of 2004 to 2007 and covers 500 incidents. Of course these are only public incidents, and are only incidents where Verizon was involved, so all assumptions are made knowing that this may or may not be representative of the population as a whole.
26% were at organizations from 1001-10,000 employees
22% had 101-1,000 employees, and 30% had 11 to 100 employees
73% of the cases involved external parties as the source of the attack, 39% were the result of partners, and 18% was the result of an insider. The numbers are somewhat skewed in that some cases were a combination of those three leading to a number higher than 100%. I would assume from that that 30% of the cases involved a combination of all three, if my logic and math is correct here. This seems to go against everything we have always heard about insiders causing the largest percentage of losses. I still believe this may hold true and is not reflected in a large number of reports because there is no evidence of insiders performing these breaches, and the companies may not even be aware of them. The more interesting statistic is the high number of breaches due to partners, and when the report looked at the number of records compromised with the probability of compromise, the partners were the biggest risk here, although closely followed by internal employees - 73 to 67 respectively. So we need to have more controls, contractual obligations and monitoring around partners, but the internal threat, when you look at the numbers of records compromised is still a big threat. When the report calculated the number of records compromised form external sources it was dramatically lower than for internal employees (30,000 vs. 187,500). And what was the source of the internal breaches you may ask. 50% of the breaches were caused by IT admins. For the partner breaches, the report stated
“Partner-side information assets and connections were compromised and used by an external entity to attack the victim’s systems in 57 percent of breaches involving a business partner. Though not a willing accomplice, the partner’s lax security practices—often outside the victim’s control—undeniably allow such attacks to take place.”
What is needed here is controls and monitoring of partners, but how much of this will be effective? Making them change their passwords every x days wouldn’t have helped (see previous entry on this from 7/15), and perhaps monitoring wouldn’t have caught this either. What about serious liability statements in the contract with monetary penalties? If vendors are on the hook for not only their losses, but yours as well, might we be able to prevent some of these? Another interesting statistic is that in 16% of the cases where partners were the source of the breach, the deliberate, malicious actions of remote IT administrators were the cause.
One of the most interesting results from the report for me is in figure 12.which illustrates patch availability at the time of the breach. In 71% of the cases, a patch was available for more than a year, and in none of the cases reviewed was there a breach where a patch was available for less than a month. In only 4% of the cases was a patch available for 1 to 3 months. So all of the meetings on the second Wednesday of the month to review the recent Microsoft patch releases are a waste of time, and we should instead be focusing on whether patches are being applied or not across the board. A simple calculation of vulnerability to host ratio will suffice here, and the number should be decreasing over time.
Another stat of note is the review of common attack pathways. In 42% of the breaches, remote access and control was the cause of the breach, and Internet facing systems were the pathway in 24% of the cases, so we again seem to be spending money and time on the wrong thing here. Simply changing vendor default passwords would have most likely prevented most of these attacks.
So once these companies were attacked it took 63% of them months to discover the breach, and 70% of the breaches were reported to them by third-parties, employees ranked second at finding them (12%), event monitoring (4%) and third-party audit (1%). Interestingly enough in 82% of the cases, the victim had the information to detect the breach, but weren’t monitoring the events carefully enough to find them. This tells me that we need to spend more money on security awareness, and develop the monitoring as well as the collection of logs. I would like to know how many of those companies had expensive SIM products in place.
So what can we glean from this report.
- We need to spend more on basic controls and procedures, and make sure they are being followed
- We need to make sure employees know where and how to report suspicious activity because it is cheaper than monitoring events and three times as effective
- If you do collect logs – have some automation in place to alert you
- Patch as much as you can across the board regardless of when the patch came out
- Watch your partner connections
- Know where the data is (66% had breaches of data they didn’t know was on the system)
- Ensure procedures and policies are being followedMonitor IT admin activity and ensure background checks are performed
Tuesday, July 15, 2008
Authentication in a B2B environment
We are trying to prevent one of the following:
- An unauthorized person at the partner organization from accessing someone else's account and information, or performing some type of fraud with someone elses account.
- An unauthorized reckless wrongdoer on the Internet from accessing the partner's information, or accessing the target system and doing bad things that cost money to either side.
- Someone leaving partner firm A and going to work for partner firm B and still having their account active.
There are probably several I cannot think of right now, but let's concentrate on these for a moment, and break them down into several risks and address them.
Risk 1 - password cracking by someone internal or external to the partner firm guessing the password.
If the account locks after several attempts, then this will be largely ineffective, and if it doesn't they would be able to script a password cracker that would most likely break the password long before the password was due to change anyways. That is unless you are going to have them change their password daily (good luck with this one). But just use a token you say, then they wouldn't be able to break their password. This is certainly a good solution for very sensitive data, but for a large group of users it gets very expensive, and usually results in the token being taped to the monitor, perhaps with the code attached to it as well. Certificates are another solution, but are not as portable as most people would like and are a bitch to manage and revoke. The more you force a user, especially someone at an external firm who probably doesn't care much about their own company's security and even less about yours to change their password, the more likely the password will be written down on their monitor, or in the clear in a spreadsheet shared by everyone in the company.
Risk 2 - person leaves partner company A and goes to work for partner company B and their account is not disabled.
If the accounts are disabled after x days of not being used then this will have the same effect without causing heartache, and I would argue less security for the people that are logging in.
For what it is worth, here is my take on this, but I would appreciate any feedback on differing opinions.
- Force users to pick passwords that are forced to be complex (contain no dictionary words, have a suitable length, Upper/lowercase, special characters, etc.)
- Disable accounts that have not been logged in for more than x days
- Lock accounts after 5 invalid attempts
- Only use tokens for very sensitive sites with a smaller number of end users. Since two factor or ten factor authentication won't prevent the trojan installed on Partner A's system from letting the user logon and piggybacking on that connection the whole way to your site.
- Audit authentication events and trigger alerts on things like several invalid attempts for several accounts being accessed from the same source, or a large number of attempts in a short period of time
In my opinion we either need to force users to change their passwords hourly or not at all. Passwords are ineffective for truly good authentication, but the alternatives are either too expensive, too difficult to mange or both to make good business sense. Furthermore, the strong authentication solutions are ineffective against today's threat, and their advantages are often circumvented by end users due to their difficulties. We need to make it easy enough for users to use without needing to circumvent the controls in place, and use risk analysis to ensure we are placing controls at the correct points to mitigate the problems mentioned earlier. Additionally, when you look at the reports from the Anti-phishing Workgroup, the FFIEC mandates that went into effect at the end of 2006, that included amongst other items, strong authentication has had no effect on phishing.
Thursday, June 26, 2008
Targeted web ads
#$%^&*!
Sorry, I fell off the soapbox, and it is getting late.
Sunday, June 15, 2008
The Chinese are coming The Chinese are coming
WASHINGTON — A congressman said Wednesday the FBI has found that four of his government computers have been hacked by sources working out of China.
Rep. Frank Wolf, a Virginia Republican, said that similar incidents — also originating from China — have taken place on computers of other members of the House and at least one House committee.
Entire Story
Now some guesses as to what might have happened:
Someone found spyware calling a server in China, and have jumped the gun, jumped the shark, and has the opportunity to make a story out of nothing.
Someone found probes from China in the firewall logs, and there were viruses caught on Capitol computers that same day - That's it, we've got them now!
There really was an attack from a Chinese source to a government computer, and knowing the government's record on information security - they somehow managed to breach the security measures in place - shocking!
Not to worry though because
"Wolf plans to introduce a resolution that he says will help ensure protection for all House computers and information systems"
I think we can all sleep a little better now
Friday, June 6, 2008
Security Requirements for Software Development
"Make sure there are no vulnerabilities that can be exploited" is always one of my favorites, but it is a little vague, and they always seem to want something more concrete. Over the years, I have kept a running list of the items I usually include in those security requirements, so for those of you that are interested, I am including it here. The list is derived from things I have seen in projects and a lot of great external sources such as OWASP, Common Criteria, etc. This list is not meant to be an exhaustive or comprehensive list, but a list that can be used as a base to draw upon when completing these types of requests. you will still need to perform threat modeling, and in depth analysis of the project, and to check that the requirements are being met in the SDLC. If anyone has any updates, suggestions, or corrections, please let me know, and I will update the list.
The link below directs you to a Google Docs page with the doc.
Security Requirements
Thanks
Monday, June 2, 2008
Software vulnerabilities and updates
Friday, May 30, 2008
Crane collpases and Information Security
We need to install x to reduce the risk of y
We need to do x to minimize the risk y
We need a review or addition of controls
We need more staff
We need more budget
Unfortunately, it takes an incident like this to produce change and to get enough attention on a topic that something is done. There is one other constant between these subjects. Whether it is a crane collapse, or a DNS takeover for a giant cable provider - there will be a fall guy to blame for both of these.
Rock On
Thursday, May 29, 2008
Stupid security trick of the month
[Memphis News]
Starting July 1st, Tennessee sex offenders are required to report their e-mail addresses, user names, and screens names to Tennessee’s Sex Offender Registry. Lawmakers created the new requirement for sex offenders during this year’s legislative session in Nashville. Police say the requirement will make it easier for them to spot sex offenders trolling for prey online.
Tuesday, May 13, 2008
Anti-virus not keeping up?
So what to do?
Defense in depth is called for here.
Systems need to be patched to minimize the attack surface
System administrators need to minimize the places users can get one of these files through the web, e-mail, IM, etc. by using content filtering.
Reduce or remove the number of local administrative users
Watch what is entering and leaving the network
Run IDS/IPS on endpoints as well as the network
Run A/V and update it often
Watch for registry changes
Run virtualization, so cleanup becomes much easier, and infections become temporary (hopefully)
Friday, January 11, 2008
REAL ID
My arguments against REAL ID are below.
It WILL NOT make us more secure.
The REAL ID can and will be forged, likely within hours, and the documents used to obtain one can be forged as well. None of the 9/11 hijackers, the Unibomber, or Tim McVeigh would have had any issues obtaining one, or they would have simply stolen the identity of someone else and obtained one. We should be spending money on awareness for security individuals at the airport so they can identify real security issues, and make sure there are solid procedures in place to prevent the breakdown of the physical protection systems.
Having a large database with all of this concentrated data in one location will make it much easier for an external hacker or an insider to obtain the data nicely in one location.
Identity does not equal security
Knowing who someone is, does not make it any easier to determine their intentions
There are more important issues we can spend money on that WILL make us more secure. Most of the arrests and "prevention of another terrorist attack" have been the result of good intelligence and good police work. We should instead spend our money on intelligence and our police departments.
Wednesday, January 9, 2008
ISP filtering for copyrighted material
One more note - encryption will take care of any filtering they are planning to use, or are they planning on banning that too?
Risk Assesments and Crying Wolf
Now comes the tie to Information Security.
Solid risk assessment and only remediating and professing the need for money to address high risk issues first ensures our words are heard and respected. Anything else makes us the Boy who cries wolf, and dilutes the message and importance.
Wednesday, January 2, 2008
2008 the year of documentation and processes
The year of PKI
The year of Identity Management
The year of Intrusion prevention
OK - you get the point
These all sound so good, and easy, just install x and all of your problems will be solved. However, we all know it is never that easy, and that most "silver bullet" solutions require that the underlying processes, and information they are meant to protect must first be understood, documented, and classified form a risk perspective. This is where most of these solutions fail to provide the protection and ROI that the salesperson will tout in their presentation. Ignoring the boring and long process of understanding where the data is that we need to protect, and how that data is used will certainly lead to security dollars being applied incorrectly, or over or under spent in certain areas. Documentation is not fun, and it is not as impressive to present to management as product x, which can be much easier to illustrate - see Mr Chairman, it is right here in this box with the pretty lights. However, only by understanding where the data is and how it is used, can we set about protecting such a valuable asset. Process documentation and procedural adherence to the processes and policies, has a measurable impact on the organization:
- It keeps the auditors happy
- It makes IT, and the business as a whole more efficient
- When something does break down in the process, it is less of a mystery to discover what broke
So I am proposing that 2008 is the year of documentation and processes - now doesn't that sound exciting?